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**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE**



INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

10 March 2014

IV-14-0006

Misuse of Information Systems

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Approved for Release by NSA on 11-01-2018, FOIA Case # 79204 (litigation)

Release: 2018-11

NSA: 05399

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(U) OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) Chartered by the NSA Director and by statute, the Office of the Inspector General conducts audits, investigations, inspections, and special studies. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA operations, provide intelligence oversight, protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources by the Agency and its affiliates, and ensure that NSA activities comply with the law. The OIG also serves as an ombudsman, assisting NSA/CSS employees, civilian and military.

(U) AUDITS

(U) The audit function provides independent assessments of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs and their internal controls. Financial audits determine the accuracy of the Agency's financial statements. All audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States.

(U) INVESTIGATIONS

(U) The OIG administers a system for receiving complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Investigations may be undertaken in response to those complaints, at the request of management, as the result of irregularities that surface during inspections and audits, or at the initiative of the Inspector General.

(U) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

(U) Intelligence oversight is designed to insure that Agency intelligence functions comply with federal law, executive orders, and DoD and NSA policies. The IO mission is grounded in Executive Order 12333, which establishes broad principles under which IC components must accomplish their missions.

(U) FIELD INSPECTIONS

(U) Inspections are organizational reviews that assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency components. The Field Inspections Division also partners with Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements and other IC entities to jointly inspect consolidated cryptologic facilities.

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I. (U) SUMMARY

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(U//~~FOUO~~) This investigation was conducted in response to a complaint alleging that

[redacted]

[redacted] used his privileged access to obtain and distribute [redacted] logon and logoff records without authorization.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG concluded that [redacted] used his privileged access to obtain and distribute [redacted] logon and logoff records without authorization in violation of NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2, Section 3(b), and NSA/CSS Policy 6-4.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A summary of our report will be forwarded to the Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI), Special Actions, Q234.

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¹ The terms "login" and "logon" are used interchangeably throughout the report. Also, the terms "logout" and "logoff" are used interchangeably throughout the report.

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II. (U) BACKGROUND

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(U) Introduction

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] has been a contractor at NSA since [redacted]. He has been assigned to [redacted] since [redacted]. [redacted] is a [redacted] and has Privileged Access (PRIVAC). This access gives [redacted] the ability to access other users' computers and event logs. The event logs contain logon and logoff times.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] allegedly obtained [redacted] logon and logoff records at the request of his friend, [redacted] resigned from NSA on [redacted].

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(U) Applicable Authorities

(U) The investigation looked at possible violations of the following authorities². See Appendix A for full citations.

- NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2, Section 3(b), Responsibilities
- NSA/CSS Policy 6-4, Contractor Use of NSA/CSS Information Systems and Resources

² Contractor employees using NSA/CSS Information Systems are subject to the entire NSA/CSS IT Policy Series, including the policies listed below, the same as Government employees. See NSA/CSS Policy 6-4 paragraph 2.

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III. (U) FINDINGS

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ **ALLEGATION:** Did [redacted] use his privileged access to obtain and distribute [redacted] logon and logoff records without authorization in violation of NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2, Section 3(b) and NSA/CSS Policy 6-4?

~~(U//FOUO)~~ **CONCLUSION:** Substantiated. The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that [redacted] used his privileged access to obtain and distribute [redacted] logon and logoff records in violation of NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2, Section 3(b) and NSA/CSS Policy 6-4.

(U) Evidence

(U) Documentary Evidence

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Emails sent on 22 April and 24 April 2013. [redacted] and [redacted] each provided the OIG with one or more of the below emails. The emails are listed in chronological order and are attached at Appendix B.

1. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 0740 hours from [redacted] to [redacted]
Subject: "Help!!!"
"Hi! How are you!?! I hope you're doing good and enjoying the nice weather... I love it. Everything is new and fresh in spring! SO [redacted] is a [redacted], and her office manager is a BEEYOTCH... She's been nasty to [redacted] and me. [redacted] keeps getting accused of putting the wrong times on her timesheet, when she is 100% certain she is putting the right times down. Is there any script or ANYTHING we can do to pull the log-in log-out times on her computer for the past two weeks? [redacted] thinks there is but wasn't sure... is there an [redacted] ticket for that lol?"

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2. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 0818 from [redacted] to [redacted]
Subject: "Help!!!"
[redacted]
[redacted] How you been? I[sic] Sorry to hear about this office manager she sounds like a real enjoyment to work with. Yeah login and out times can def be traced. I would be happy to take a look but that would take a while, if she wasn't in a rush I would. It is just a matter of looking at logon and off times in the security log. This is the route I would go: [redacted]

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3. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 0900 from [redacted] to [redacted]
 Subject: "Help!!!"
 "... Do you mind taking a look for us on Wednesday? She is off today and Thursday. I'll really just need her login times for the two weeks (April 8-19th). Is that too much to ask? If so I'll submit the [redacted] ticket. I just wasn't sure if they would support that or not. Her OM / Supervisor is SO nasty! [redacted] is really OCD and she always puts the exact time on her timesheet, plus [redacted] has beat it into her head not to cheat on her timesheet, and her supervisor keeps accusing her by being off by 30-minutes when [redacted] KNOWS that it's right. poor kid."

(b) (6)

4. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 0914 from [redacted] to [redacted]
 Subject: "Help!!!"
 "...Nope I don't mind taking a look. I am the same way I am a**1 about my timesheet even if I go for lunch. Timesheet is one thing you can't cheat on I have learned that too. With all the badging in we do they can track everything if need to. Her boss must be jealous of her or something lol. Just cause she is prettier lol That is just mean lol."

5. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 11:28 from [redacted] to [redacted]
 Subject: "Help!!!"
 "...Thank you. We'll touch base about it Wednesday. LOL. That must be what it is. Her boss is a hater!"

6. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 1131 from [redacted] to [redacted] and
 Cc'd to [redacted] and [redacted]
 Subject: "Important!"
 [redacted] I will be in class when you get back to work on Wednesday, but my friend from [redacted] is going to get into your machine and pull your login/logoff times for the past two weeks (8-19 April). Then you can compare them to your timesheet. Make sure you get a screenshot of the times and save it to your computer. So on Wednesday, email [redacted] [redacted] (cc'd) and he'll know what to do. THANK YOU [redacted]. As always, you are the best."

7. Email sent on 22 April 2013 at 1427 from [redacted] to [redacted] and
 [redacted] and Cc'd to [redacted]
 Subject: "Important!"
 Attachments: [redacted].xlsx"
 "She is very consistent as you can see."

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8. Email sent on 24 April 2013 at 0717 from [redacted] to [redacted]
 Subject: "Login/Logoff Times"
 [redacted] I was able to pull your login / logoff times for the last ppd - as you can see, you

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are very consistent and you remembered correctly – you never showed up after 1200. In fact, if all NSA employees were as consistent as you, that would be awesome!

Date	Login	Logout
8-Apr	11:51am	3:50pm
9-Apr	11:50am	3:49pm
10-Apr	11:52am	3:52pm
11-Apr	11:53am	3:49pm
12-Apr	11:51am	3:52pm

15-Apr	11:54am	3:53pm
16-Apr	11:13am	3:11pm
17-Apr	11:50am	3:56pm
18-Apr	11:51am	3:55pm
19-Apr	11:49am	3:55pm

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[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Email from [Redacted] On 30 July 2013 [Redacted] Deputy Program Manager, [Redacted] emailed the OIG that [Redacted] does not provide any specific data about another user unless the request is from the [Redacted] Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (ADS&CI), or OIG.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Email from [Redacted] On 31 July 2013 [Redacted] [Redacted] emailed the OIG that [Redacted] provides logon/logoff records only on request from the NISIRT/SHO.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Email from NISIRT. On 1 August 2013 NISIRT [Redacted] sent the OIG a report regarding [Redacted] activity on 22 April 2013. NISIRT did not find any information that indicates the request to pull [Redacted] logon and logoff records was tasked through NISIRT.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Verified logon and logoff times. On 22 October 2013 the OIG confirmed with NISIRT, [Redacted] that the logon and logoff times [Redacted] provided to the [Redacted] were accurate.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] email to the OIG. On 30 September 2013 [Redacted] sent the OIG an email after his interview with the OIG that morning. [Redacted] stated the following in his email: "Just wanted to give you a heads up that I initiated a ticket to restore my email from the month of April. Should take a few hours to restore so I should have them to you tomorrow or later today. I checked through the tickets but wasn't able to find one so I am thinking what I said initially that one was not created." This email is attached at Appendix C.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) **PRIVAC Briefing document.** The PRIVAC briefing document was obtained from NSA net, "go PRIVAC." This document states that individuals possessing root passwords or "super user" privileges are considered to have privileged access. It further states that PRIVAC will be used only to accomplish authorized duties. This document is attached at Appendix D.

(U) Testimonial Evidence

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] Technical Director [redacted] was interviewed on 25 July 2013 and provided the following sworn testimony:

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was accused several times by her supervisor of submitting inaccurate timesheets. [redacted] is aware of the ramifications of timesheet fraud and felt that the timecard issue needed to be addressed. He and [redacted] NSA employee [redacted] looked for ways to help her in this situation, believing that [redacted] was being truthful about her time and attendance. [redacted] recalled from his "technical days" that logon and logoff times can be obtained. [redacted] attempted to get his own log times from his computer and realized that it was not possible. At that point he "let it drop." [redacted] told [redacted] that she was on [redacted] and found information on how to get logon and logoff times. She also told him that she spoke to her friend [redacted] a System Administrator, about obtaining that information. [redacted] told [redacted] that she could submit a ticket or that he could get the logon and logoff times for her. [redacted] told [redacted] "Yeah, get it for me."

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] has never met [redacted] or spoken with him. [redacted] is not sure if [redacted] copied him on an email with the logon and logoff records or if [redacted] sent them to him. Once [redacted] received the logon and logoff records he forwarded them to [redacted] without [redacted] and [redacted] names, so that she could forward his email to her supervisor. The records were an extraction from [redacted] logon and logoff times for the specific pay period in question.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was interviewed on 29 July 2013 and provided the following sworn testimony:

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] has been a [redacted] in her current position for two years. [redacted] joined NSA in 2009. [redacted] is [redacted] and, on several occasions, [redacted] supervisor accused her of cheating on her timesheet. [redacted] asked [redacted] and [redacted] what she should do. [redacted] told [redacted] that she needs to be 100% sure that she is not cheating and needs to tell that to her supervisor. She followed that recommendation; however, her supervisor continued to accuse her of submitting false timesheets.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] conducted a query on NSAnet to see if it was possible for a person to obtain their own logon and logoff times. She found on [redacted] that you can with a certain script run on the computer but she did not know how to run the script. That same morning [redacted]

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[redacted] contacted her friend, [redacted] and asked if she could run the script herself or if there was an [redacted] ticket to submit. [redacted] told her there is an [redacted] ticket she can submit but he offered to pull the times for her. He asked her if she wanted him to do that and she said okay. [redacted] explained to [redacted] that they needed [redacted] logon and logoff times for the last two weeks to compare them to her timesheet so that they could know for sure that she was not falsifying her timesheet.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] told [redacted] about the script and that she was going to ask her friend, [redacted] if she could submit an [redacted] ticket. [redacted] responded "okay." [redacted] does not think [redacted] ever talked to [redacted]. She sent an email to [redacted] and copied [redacted] and [redacted] on the email because she was going on leave. In the email she told [redacted] that [redacted] could help her. She thinks [redacted] hit "Reply All" to that email when he sent the email with the logon and logoff records attached.

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(U//FOUO) [redacted] has known [redacted] for about three years. Three years ago [redacted] helped [redacted] for a week on shared folder permission issues. They continued "chit chatting" at work. They do not have a relationship outside of work except they are "friends" on Facebook.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] thought about asking [redacted] to submit a ticket herself to get the logon and logoff records but [redacted] works only four hours per day and was not at work at the time. Additionally, [redacted] made the offer to obtain the information. [redacted] had no idea that she was doing anything wrong. Also, [redacted] thought [redacted] was going to submit a ticket and assign it to himself because that is what he did three years earlier, when he helped her with the shared folder issue. [redacted] assumed he would follow "whatever" policy they had in his office. [redacted] still does not know if [redacted] submitted a ticket. She was under the impression that he was authorized to pull those records.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] Contractor and Systems Administrator, [redacted] was interviewed on 30 September 2013 and provided the following sworn testimony:

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has been a Systems Administrator for eight years. He performs [redacted] Sometimes he receives calls directly from the customer but usually he receives a call from the [redacted] team when they are not able to correct an issue. At that point they [redacted] call the customer to fix it.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has "super user" privileges, also known as PRIVAC, which gives him the ability to access other user's machines to install software. [redacted] has PRIVAC because his job requires him to access computer event logs. He took a PRIVAC briefing and believes there was a list of things he could and could not do, however, he does not remember the details. He believes he takes PRIVAC training every year and had to take PRIVAC training a couple of months ago. In addition to accessing computer event logs, [redacted] has PRIVAC

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so that he can install software and give customers access to certain folders. [redacted] performs these tasks when he receives a ticket. He is not sure if an email is sufficient, but when a customer emails him directly requesting assistance, he creates a ticket for the request.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] was informed by [redacted] that [redacted] boss was accusing [redacted] of arriving to work 10 or 15 minutes late every day. [redacted] emailed [redacted] asking if he could see when [redacted] was logging on and logging out of her computer. [redacted] looked at [redacted] event log for the logon and logoff times for a certain period, entered the times into a spreadsheet, and sent the spreadsheet to [redacted] and [redacted].

(U//FOU) [redacted] does not think he created a ticket for this task. He should have submitted a ticket and if he received another request like this he would have asked her to submit a ticket. [redacted] did not submit a ticket because [redacted] was asking for her own records. [redacted] did not think it was wrong to provide her that information because he was not "disclosing data or anything like that." However, he knows the correct way to do it is to submit a ticket first.

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(U//FOUO) [redacted] was working on other tickets when he began searching for [redacted] logon and logoff times so it took a few hours to pull the information. However, the actual time he spent retrieving [redacted] logon and logoff times was 10 minutes. To access a user's security log he does not need to log onto the user's computer, he can view the log from his own computer.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has not helped [redacted] with any other requests that were not submitted via the ticket system. [redacted] cannot recall any other instances where he would not have submitted a ticket or received one. Although [redacted] does not believe that there was a ticket created for this request, the possibility exists that there was a ticket and he simply forgot about it. He planned to double-check his records after the OIG interview.

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(U) Analysis and Conclusions

(U//FOUO) [redacted] and [redacted] have known each other for about three years and have continued a friendly relationship at work as well as through social networking (Facebook). [redacted] went directly to [redacted] and asked for his assistance to help [redacted] [redacted] used his privileged access to pull logon and logoff times to benefit his friend, [redacted] and [redacted]. NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3 states that information systems (ISs) are for official government and/or mission related purposes. Additionally, NSA/CSS Policy 6-4 states that contractors shall use NSA/CSS ISs only to perform tasks that are authorized by contract, approved by the Contracting Officer, or permitted by this policy. [redacted] was not tasked by NISIRT, the OIG, Security, or his office to retrieve [redacted] logon and logoff records. [redacted] did not submit

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a ticket or notify appropriate officials of this activity. [redacted] performed this activity on his own to help his friend [redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that [redacted] used his privileged access to obtain and distribute logon and logoff records for a friend without authorization in violation of NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2, Section 3(b) and NSA/CSS Policy 6-4.

[redacted]
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

[redacted]
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
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V. (U) RESPONSE TO TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 21 February 2014 the OIG notified [redacted] of the tentative conclusions. On 3 March 2014 [redacted] responded with the following:

“I am sorry I was on vacation all last week. When I received the email to check login and logout times I thought it was ok as it was the customer requesting it and it was her times and not for someone else. I understand it was [redacted] asking but it was on her behalf she was asking. I understand that a ticket should have been submitted for records of me gathering the logon and logoff times. In the future I will always have the customer submit a ticket and get the proper approvals for my actions. I apologize for this.”

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] response provided no new information relative to the conclusions or requiring additional investigation; therefore, the conclusions remain unchanged.

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VI. (U) CONCLUSION

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that [redacted] used his privileged access to obtain and distribute logon and logoff records for a friend without authorization in violation of NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2, Section 3(b) and NSA/CSS Policy 6-4.

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VII. (U) DISTRIBUTION OF RESULTS

(U//~~FOUO~~) A copy of this report of investigation will be provided to:

- A. D23, Office of General Counsel, for information.
- B. MR, Employee Relations for any action deemed appropriate.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A summary of this report of investigation will be provided to:

- A. Q234, ADS&CI (Special Actions) for information;

[Redacted]

Investigator

Concurred by:

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[Redacted]

Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations

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APPENDIX A

(U) Applicable Authorities

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(U) NSA/CSS Policy Manual 6-3, Chapter 2

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) All NSA/CSS IS users shall:

b. Use ISs for official government and/or mission related-purposes. However, after obtaining their immediate supervisor's authorization, users may conduct limited personal communications while using a NSA/CSS sponsored account or while using U.S. Government resources, such as ISs, consistent with the provisions contained with the Joint Ethics Regulation.

(U) NSA/CSS Policy 6-4, Policy

(U) Contractors shall use NSA/CSS ISs only to perform tasks that are authorized by contract, approved by the Contracting Officer, or permitted by this policy.

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APPENDIX B

(U) Emails sent on 22 April and 24 April 2013


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APPENDIX C

(U email to the OIG



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APPENDIX D

(U) PRIVAC Briefing document

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(U) Emails sent on 22 April and 24 April 2013

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APPENDIX C

(U) email to the OIG

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APPENDIX D

(U) PRIVAC Briefing Document

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APPENDIX E

(U) response to the OIG



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APPENDIX B

(U) Emails sent on 22 April and 24 April 2013

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[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 11:28 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) Help!!!

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[Redacted]

Thank you. ☺ We'll touch base about it Wednesday. LOL. That must be what it is. Her boss is a hater!

[Redacted]

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From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 9:14 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) Help!!!

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[Redacted]

Nope I don't mind taking a look. I am the same way I am a**l about my timesheet even if I go for lunch. Timesheet is one thing you can't cheat on, have learned that too. With all the badging in we do they can track everything if need to. Her boss must be jealous of her or something lol. Just cause she is prettier lol. That is just mean lol.

(U//FOUO) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 9:00 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) Help!!!

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[Redacted]

Do you mind taking a look for us on Wednesday? She is off today and Thursday. I'll really just need her login times for the two weeks (April 8-19th). Is that too much to ask? If so I'll submit the [Redacted] ticket, I just wasn't sure if they would support that or not. Her OM / Supervisor is SO nasty! [Redacted] is really OCD and she always puts the exact time on her timesheet, plus [Redacted] has beat it into her head not to cheat on her timesheet, and her supervisor keeps accusing her by being off by 30 minutes when [Redacted] KNOWS that it's right. poor kid. ☹

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[Redacted]

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From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 8:18 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) Help!!!

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] How you been? I

Sorry to hear about this office manager she sounds like a real enjoyment to work with. Yeah login and out times can def be traced. I would be happy to take a look but that would take a while, if she wasn't in a rush I would. It is just a matter of looking at logon and off times in the security log.

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This is the route I would go:

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 7:40 AM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: (U) Help!!!

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Hi! How are you!?! I hope you're doing good and enjoying the nice weather... I love it. ☺ Everything is new and fresh in spring!

SO, [redacted] is a [redacted] and her office manager is a BEEYOTCH... She's been nasty to [redacted] and me. [redacted] [redacted] keeps getting accused of putting the wrong times on her timesheet, when she is 100% certain she is putting the right times down. Is there any script or ANYTHING we can do to pull the log-in log-out times on her computer for the past two weeks? [redacted] thinks there is but wasn't sure... is there an [redacted] ticket for that lol!?

[redacted]

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Monday, April 22, 2013 2:27 PM

RE: (U) Important!
xlsx

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She is very consistent as you can see.

(U//FOUO)

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(b) (6)

From:
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 11:31 AM
To:
Cc:
Subject: (U) Important!

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I will be in class when you get back to work on Wednesday, but my friend from [redacted] is going to get into your machine and pull your login / logout times for the past two weeks (8-19 April.) Then you can compare them to your timesheet. Make sure you get a screenshot of the times and save it to your computer.

So on Wednesday, email [redacted] (cc'd) and he'll know what to do.

THANK YOU [redacted] As always, you are the best.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Date	Login	Logout
8-Apr	11:51am	3:50pm
9-Apr	11:50am	3:49pm
10-Apr	11:52am	3:52pm
11-Apr	11:53am	3:49pm
12-Apr	11:51am	3:52pm
15-Apr	11:54am	3:53pm
16-Apr	11:13am	3:11pm
17-Apr	11:50am	3:56pm
18-Apr	11:51am	3:55pm
19-Apr	11:49am	3:55pm

UNCLASSIFIED

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

[Redacted]
Wednesday, April 24, 2013 7:17 AM
[Redacted]
(U) Login/Logoff Times

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[Redacted]

I was able to pull your login / logoff times for the last ppd - as you can see, you are very consistent and you remembered correctly - you never showed up after 1200. In fact, if all NSA employees were as consistent as you, that would be awesome!

Date	Login	Logout
8-Apr	11:51am	3:50pm
9-Apr	11:50am	3:49pm
10-Apr	11:52am	3:52pm
11-Apr	11:53am	3:49pm
12-Apr	11:51am	3:52pm

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15-Apr	11:54am	3:53pm
16-Apr	11:13am	3:11pm
17-Apr	11:50am	3:56pm
18-Apr	11:51am	3:55pm
19-Apr	11:49am	3:55pm

[Redacted]

(b) (6)

(U//~~FOUO~~)

[Redacted]

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APPENDIX C

(U) email to the OIG

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(b) (6)

Personnel Privileged Information
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[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2013 12:02 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) OIG Inquiry

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36
(b) (6)

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Just wanted to give you a heads up that I initiated a ticket to restore my email from the month of April. Should take a few hours to restore so I should have them to you tomorrow or later today. I checked through the tickets but wasn't able to find one so I am thinking what I said initially that one was not created.

(U//FOUO) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2013 1:25 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) OIG Inquiry

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1000 works for me and it's okay if you are early. You don't need to bring anything with you. To enter our door you will need to buzz in.

See you Monday.

[Redacted]

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO)
[Redacted]
Investigator
Office of the Inspector General
963-0947(s)
[Redacted]

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2013 1:24 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: RE: (U) OIG Inquiry

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Does 10am sound good to you? The bus leaves at 9:30 so I might be a few mins early.

Thanks,

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
(b) (6)

From: [Redacted]
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2013 12:52 PM
To: [Redacted]
Subject: (U) OIG Inquiry

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[Redacted]

The OIG received information that you retrieved and distributed computer data without proper authorization. The OIG has opened an inquiry into this matter. I would like to give you an opportunity to discuss this matter with me. This is a voluntary interview. The interview is held in OIG spaces in [Redacted]. The interview will only last about an hour or less. I am available this afternoon between 1400 and 1630, or on Monday, September 30th anytime between 0930 and 1630.

If you would like to meet with me, please let me know via email, and provide the best date/time for you.

Thank you,

[Redacted]

(U//FOUO)

[Redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Investigator
Office of the Inspector General
963-0947(s)

[Redacted]

"PRIVACY SENSITIVE - any misuse or unauthorized disclosure may lead to disciplinary action."

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

APPENDIX D


(U) PRIVAC Briefing Document

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PRIVAC Briefing



Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52


Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: ~~20371201~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL REL TO USACTIVITY~~

~~Unclassified // For official use only~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL REF ID: A66404~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL REF ID: A66404~~
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(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Derived From: NSACSSM E-32
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: ~~20371201~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL REF ID: A66404~~
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